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SOME REALISM ABOUT BAR ASSOCIATIONS
Elizabeth Chambliss* and Bruce A. Green**

INTRODUCTION

What are bar associations' responsibilities for law reform? Under

what conditions do bar association committees act in the public interest? Do lawyers even believe in the "public" interest as something
that can be collectively defined?
The American Bar Association (ABA) encourages all lawyers to
participate in activities "for improving the law, the legal system [and]

the legal profession."' The ABA assumes that, "[b]y reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures
therein."'2 It views such efforts as part of lawyers' professional obligation as "public citizens,"' 3 as well as lawyers' obligation to work "pro
bono publico."'4 The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code") regards lawyers' obligations to assist in improving
5
the legal system as an axiomatic and foundational norm.
Lawyers' efforts to improve the law and the legal system may take
various forms, but ABA Model Rule 6.1 first lists service on bar association committees. 6 Bar associations, too, take various forms and
* Professor and Co-Director, Center for Professional Values and Practice, New York Law

School.
** Louis Stein Professor and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Law
School. The authors are grateful to Professor Stephan Landsman for the invitation to participate
in the Thirteenth Annual Clifford Symposium and to Professor David Franklin and other symposium participants for their helpful comments on the original draft. The authors also thank Barry
Temkin for his thoughtful comments.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1(b)(3) (2006).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1986).
3. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON THE RENAISSANCE OF IDEALISM IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION,

FINAL REPORT-AuGUST 2006 1 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/renaissance/downloads/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter ABA RENAISSANCE REPORT] (referring to lawyers' "time-honored role...
as public citizen[s]").
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2006).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1986) ("A Lawyer Should Assist in
Improving the Legal System"); id. at Preliminary Statement ("The Canons are statements of
axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of
lawyers .... ).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 6.1 cmt. 8 (2006) (providing examples of valuable
law reform activities).
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have various goals. 7 But most bar associations engage in at least some
activities aimed at improving the law, such as drafting model statutes,
commenting on proposed legislation, and weighing in on legal and
public policy debates."
The normative expectations are different for a lawyer working to
improve the law than for a lawyer representing a client. As a client's
advocate, a lawyer must zealously pursue legal objectives sought by
the client without regard to the lawyer's personal views. 9 When a lawyer serves in a nonrepresentative capacity, by contrast, the ABA directs the lawyer to act "without regard to the general interests or
desires of clients or former clients" 10 and to "espouse only those
changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public inter-

7. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 193, 193-94 (1996) (distinguishing between comprehensive and specialty bar associations);
Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the
Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 36 (1994) (distinguishing between unified and voluntary state bar associations). There are hundreds of bar associations in the United States, including 282 state and local bar associations with at least 300 members. ABA Div. FOR BAR
SERVS., 2005 BAR ACrlVmES INVENTORY (Joanne O'Reilly ed., 2006) [hereinafter 2005 BAR
ACTIVITIES INVENTORY]. The ABA is the largest comprehensive bar association, with over

400,000 members in 2006. See About the American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/
about/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). The American Association for Justice (AAJ) (formerly the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America) is the largest specialty bar with about 56,000 members.
See About AAJ, http://www.atla.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2007); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 738 (Sandra Jaszczat ed., 1996). Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have unified bars, meaning that a statute or court rule requires membership as a
condition of practice. See ABA Div. for Bar Servs., http://www.abanet.orglbarserv/stlobar.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (providing a U.S. map showing the thirty-two states with unified
bars); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE ALASKA BAR Ass'N, SUNSET REVIEW FOLLOW-UP, Audit
Control Number 41-20050-06, at 37 (2006), available at http://www.legaudit.state.ak.us/pages/audits/2006/pdf/20050rpt.pdf.
8. See generally Johnstone, supra note 7 (reviewing the structure, activities, and effectiveness
of the major comprehensive bar associations). Johnstone writes that, "[a]lthough there are sharp
differences .. .in policy priorities and implementation, the major comprehensive bar associations today are remarkably similar in the policies they seek to advance," including "advocating
needed changes in the law and opposing those they consider undesirable." Id. at 195-96.
9. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 8-4 (1986). The rules on con-

flicts of interest prohibit a lawyer from representing a client if the lawyer's personal beliefs
would impair his ability to serve the client's objectives. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.7 cmt. 10 (2006).
10.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC

8-1 (1986).
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est.""

As the rules of the American Law Institute (ALI) state,

"members are expected to leave client interests at the door.' 12
Yet, while the lawyer-statesman is a powerful icon among American

lawyers,' 3 many observers are skeptical that lawyers, individually or
collectively, can set aside their clients' interests, political leanings, and
other biases to serve as purely public-interested members of the "governing class."'1 4 As Robert W. Gordon has written, "when lawyers
start talking this way about their public duties ... most of us understand that we have left ordinary life far behind for the hazy aspirational world of the Law Day sermon and Bar Association after-dinner
speech-inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real.' 5 Some argue that the profession has become more commercial and instrumen16
tal than ever before.
11. Id. at EC 8-4. The bar has instructed lawyers engaging in law reform "to identify the
capacity in which he appears, whether on behalf of himself, a client, or the public." Id.; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.4 (2006).

A lawyer who makes a presentation to a

legislature or administrative agency regarding a proposed change in the law would be engaging
in impermissible deceit if he failed to disclose the fact that the appearance is on behalf of a
client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.9.
12. Am. Law Inst., Rules of the Council, Rule 4.03 (2007), http://ali.org/doc/rules-council.pdf.
The full text of the rule reads as follows:
To maintain the Institute's reputation for thoughtful, disinterested analysis of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door. In communications
made within the framework of Institute proceedings, members should speak, write, and
vote on the basis of their personal and professional convictions and experience without
regard to client interests or self-interest.
Id.
13. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (discussing the ideal of lawyers as "a separate estate ... independen[t] from the dominant factions of
civil society"). Most scholars trace the conception of the lawyer-statesman to Tocqueville.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263-70 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., 1969) (1850). Tocqueville's views, in turn, were influenced by the leading Federalist lawyers. See Gordon, supra, at 14; Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understandingof the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 382 n.5 (2001) (locating the origins of the governing class idea
"not in Tocqueville but in the political understandings of American lawyers").
14. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-

1-4, 354-75 (1993) (decrying the loss of the lawyer-statesman ideal); Pearce, supra note
13, at 407-20 (analyzing the collapse of the "governing class" ideal).
15. Gordon, supra note 13, at 13.
16. KRONMAN, supra note 14, at 7 (stating his "gloomy conclusion" that the ideal of the lawyer-statesman cannot be revived); SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18 (1994) (discussing the
"deterioration" of lawyers' morals and manners and stating that "we did better in the past");
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 136 (2006)
(acknowledging that lawyers have always engaged in "professional hand-wringing," but suggesting that the current level of instrumentalism is something new); Gordon, supra note 13, at 51
(analyzing the necessary conditions for lawyer independence and concluding that "the rhetoric
of decline has captured something real").
FESSION
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The empirical literature on bar associations likewise invites a certain amount of cynicism-or at least pessimism-about the possibility
of public-interested law reform. Research shows that representative
17
bar groups tend to be politically ineffective due to internal division.
Most examples of effective bar influence involve elite, ideologically
homogenous groups. 18 Recent research on the effects of group deliberation on decision making also suggests some reason to be skeptical
about the benefits of democratic deliberation for public policy outcomes. 1 9 Such research points to enduring questions about the role of
20
professionals in democracy and the nature of public policy expertise.
This Article considers the implications of this research for the role
of bar associations in law reform. It focuses primarily on comprehensive, 21 voluntary 22 bar associations, such as the ABA and voluntary
state and local bars. Part II identifies various sources of bias in individual lawyers' advocacy of the public interest while serving on bar
17. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY:

LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PRO-

119 (1987) (discussing the "contradictions of inclusiveness" in the
Chicago Bar Association); John P. Heinz et al., Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an
Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 717,
771-72 (discussing the tension between diverse membership and political efficacy).
FESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT

18. See MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMA-

177-93 (1988) (discussing the assets and liabilities of elite organizations); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP
(1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 144 (2002) (discussing the shared legal and political views
of the early NAACP).
19. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez. When Does Deliberating Improve
TION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION

Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 12 (2006) (finding that deliberation tends to

decrease social welfare); David Schkade et al., What Happenedon Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 915, 926 (2007) (discussing the phenomenon of group polarization); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 79-96 (2000) (reviewing
experimental research on group deliberation).
20. See STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 1-20 (1994) (arguing that there has been a shift from "social trustee"

to "expert" professionalism in the United States), POWELL. supra note 18, at 225-50 (discussing
the role of legal elites); Gordon, supra note 13, at 68-83 (reviewing and rejecting various critiques of the lawyer-statesman ideal).
21. There has been relatively little empirical research on specialty bar associations. What research exists suggests that the dynamics of group deliberation are similar to those in comprehensive associations. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
22. The Supreme Court has held that there are constitutional limits on the funding of political
activities by unified (compulsory) bar associations. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1.
14 (1990) (The First Amendment limits the expenditure of compulsory dues to expenditures "for
the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of... legal service[s]" in
the state. (internal quotation marks omitted)). A number of scholars have criticized this ruling
and the unified bar concept generally. See David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Profession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 163 (arguing that Keller encouraged political disengagement); Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar
Concept: Generalizingfrom the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (arguing that the
unified bar should be abolished); Smith, supra note 7 (arguing the same).
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committees. 23 Part III considers the extent to which such biases can
be overcome by carefully structuring the collective debate-to include
diverse views, for example-and concludes that viewpoint diversity,
24
without more, has proven to be ineffective.
Part IV analyzes the implications of the research for the role and
design of bar law reform committees. 25 First, it argues that bar groups
should be more explicit about the goals of law reform and the limits of
legal expertise regarding contested political values. This does not
mean that bar associations should avoid political engagement altogether, as some have suggested.2 6 Instead, bar associations should
strive to set a public example of productive political debate by gearing
their efforts toward research, fact finding, and the clear articulation of
issues, rather than focusing primarily or exclusively on policy outcomes. 27 The bar should also promote the associative and expressive
benefits of civic debate. 28 In other words, to the extent that law reform efforts raise divisive value questions, the bar should shift its attention from outcome to process, association, and expression.
Part IV also proposes that, in designing committees, bar leaders
should be attentive to research on bar associations and the dynamics
of group deliberation and should strive to contribute to this research
by testing proposed innovations-for example, the use of a
facilitator. 29 Such self-study would have immense value for the pro-

23. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 42-104 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 105-136 and accompanying text.
26. See Johnstone, supra note 7, at 240 (recommending that bar associations avoid "contentious social issues"); David M. Leonard, The American Bar Association: An Appearance of Propriety, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 537, 547-49 (1993) (arguing that the ABA is excessively

politicized and should avoid taking stances on public policy issues).
27. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 349 (2004) (exploring "the possible role of the lawyer in ... newer forms of structured
democratic discourse"): Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 935-36 (suggesting that group polarization may be less extreme when the group is not asked to make a collective decision).

28. See DIANA C. MuiTZ. HEARING THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY 74-77 (2006) (finding that exposure to competing views tends to increase an individual's political tolerance); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 351-59 (reviewing arguments about
the benefits of democratic deliberation as an end in itself); Schkade et al., supra note 19, at
929-30 (noting the "desirable social effects" of political deliberation in mixed groups).
29. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, CTR. FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATIVE POLLING:
TOWARD A BE--FrER-INFORMED DEMOCRACY, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary/ (last

visited Nov. 1, 2007) (finding "dramatic, statistically significant changes in views" as the result of
facilitated deliberation); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 361-62 (discussing the importance
of a facilitator in building group consensus); Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 939; Sunstein, supra
note 19, at 117 (discussing Fishkin's research).
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fession, 30 both academically and practically, and would further
tribute to the design of deliberative institutions. 31 Systematic
study would also go a long way toward grounding discussions of
yer "professionalism" and providing practical strategies
32
improvement.

II.

conselflawfor

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL BIAS

There are reasons to doubt whether individual lawyers do, or can,
set aside client interests when serving on bar law reform committees.
As a threshold matter, the bar association itself may not be clear
about its purpose in law reform. Although bar associations typically
identify public service as one of their goals, and may even claim or
imply a primarily public-interested stance, most also purport to serve
their own members and the profession generally and do not address
potential conflicts of interest among members, the profession, and the
public. 33 Thus, bar members who serve on law reform committees
may not have a clear understanding of the role they are expected to
play.
Further, even if the association as an entity is committed to promoting the public interest, it does not follow that the association expects
individual lawyers to serve disinterestedly in this effort. One could
argue that the public interest is best served through a process in which
each lawyer zealously represents her clients' special interests. 34 Indeed, many argue that this is the dominant professional ideology
among lawyers today.3 5 Thus, in the absence of instruction, individual
30. See Alex Elson, From the Trenches and Towers: The Case for an In-Depth Study of the
American Law Institute, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 625, 627 (1998) (arguing that in-depth study of
the ALl is "overdue").
31. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 349 (discussing lawyers' potential contributions to
"democratic experimentalism").
32. See Rob Atkinson. A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L.
REV. 259 (1995) (criticizing the religious nature of the "professionalism crusade"); Samuel J.
Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REV. 217, 220-21
(2002) (arguing that most statements about lawyer professionalism are divorced from empirical
observation and "accessible only to believers").
33. See Johnstone, supra note 7, at 195 (stating that most bar associations "aim to benefit
three principal target groups: individual lawyers, the legal profession generally, and the public at
large").
34. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). See also Gordon, supra note 13, at 10-11 (discussing the "ideal of
liberal advocacy").
35. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 87-89 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing

the "standard conception" of the lawyer's ethical role); Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism
About Professionalism: Core Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
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lawyers may assume that they were appointed to the committee because of their identification with a particular set of client interests and
therefore are expected to serve in a representative capacity.
Finally, even if the association is explicit about its commitment to
the public interest and its belief that individual lawyers should adopt a
public orientation, it is unlikely that private practitioners will be able
to fully set aside client interests. To begin with, there is a selection
bias. Lawyers who disagree with their clients' positions on law reform
will have little incentive to make their disagreements public by serving
on a bar committee. 36 Most clients would view such active opposition
as disloyal and punish their lawyers and their firms by withdrawing
their business. Many law firms discourage or prohibit public service
that would offend paying clients. 37 Thus, lawyers who are inclined to
serve on bar committees are likely to choose areas in which their interests are compatible with their clients' interests.
Furthermore, lawyers' own beliefs about the public interest are
likely to be strongly influenced by their practice. Most lawyers identify, or at least empathize, with their clients' interests and may share
many aspects of their clients' worldviews. 38 No matter how conscientiously they try to balance competing interests, lawyers who represent
individuals in white-collar criminal investigations are likely to better
understand the interests of individual employees and emphasize the
individual's interest in being treated fairly. Corporate counsel are
likely to better understand the role of the attorney-client privilege in
obtaining information from employees and emphasize the importance
of the privilege in promoting corporate compliance with law. And
government lawyers are likely to better understand the challenges and
1067, 1068 (2007) (discussing the rise of a "libertarian ideology" of law practice that denies "any
public obligation other than to serve the client").
36. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 23 (stating that "few lawyers will feel like engaging in ...
public campaigns to make life harder on their clients").
37. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE
PROFESSIONS 146-48 (2005); Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 116-23 (2004); Esther F. Lardent, PositionalConflict in the Pro Bono Context: Ethical
Considerationsand Market Forces, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2280 (1999); Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: PositionalConflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN.

AND THE

L. REV. 1395, 1409-19 (1998).
38. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0.

LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:

THE SOCIAL STRUC-

TURE OF THE BAR 137-66 (1982); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:
TRANSFORMATION

OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM

THE SOCIAL

231-69 (1988) (discussing corporate lawyers);

Gordon, supra note 13, at 56-58; Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm

Practitioners,41 Hous. L. REV. 309 (2004) (discussing solo and small firm practitioners); Sara
Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Constructionof the Plaintiffs' PersonalInjury Bar,

30

LAW & SOC. INQUIRY

269 (2005) (discussing plaintiffs' lawyers).
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complexities of corporate investigations and have greater confidence
in government lawyers' integrity and sense of proportion.
If the lawyer has a diverse clientele, it is possible that differing client interests will balance each other out. For example, matrimonial
lawyers who represent both husbands and wives, commercial lawyers
who represent both buyers and sellers, bankruptcy lawyers who represent both debtors and creditors, and mergers-and-acquisitions lawyers who represent both acquiring and target companies may find that
relevant client interests are in equipoise. Yet, while a diverse clientele
may increase lawyers' independence from any one set of clients, it also
gives lawyers an incentive to avoid actively espousing their own
39
views.
In any case, many areas of practice involve a relatively unitary and
distinctive set of interests. In some areas, such as criminal law, where
lawyers cannot serve simultaneously as public prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers, it will be impossible to have a balanced clientele.
The same is true for in-house counsel and other lawyers who have
only one client. Thus, it seems unrealistic to expect that private practitioners will be able to serve in a wholly disinterested manner when
dealing with matters directly affecting their clients' interests. If one
were to choose a single lawyer to define the public interest, it would
not be a lawyer whose clients have a significant stake in the outcome.
One might imagine that the solution lies in carefully structuring bar
law reform committees to ensure the inclusion of members with a
broad range of views. Certainly, broad representation is important if
individual committee members are expected to serve in a representative capacity. But, even if each individual member is expected to promote the public interest, presumably the collective discussion would
benefit from diverse views.
As Part III explains, however, viewpoint diversity tends to be an
ineffective strategy for bar-sponsored law reform. Rather than leading to balanced proposals backed by robust consensus, viewpoint diversity tends to lead to stalemate or trivial, symbolic action.
Historically, most significant reforms have been accomplished by
small, like-minded groups of elite lawyers, who innocently-or arrogantly-believed that theirs was a universal definition of the common
good. 40 Research on group deliberation likewise suggests a choice between preexisting consensus or stalemate. 4' The question, then, is
39. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 36 (discussing the pros and cons of client diversity for lawyer independence).
40. See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 71-104 and accompanying text.
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whether there is any productive public policy role for a representative
bar.
III.

THE LIMITS OF VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY

The empirical literature on bar associations focuses mainly on the
history and politics of the ABA 4 2 and the major urban bars. 43 Perhaps
the central theme of this literature is the trade-off between membership diversity and political efficacy. In an early, influential study of
the Chicago Bar Association (CBA), John P. Heinz and his coauthors
described the problem as follows:
Herein lies the dilemma of every professional association. The
more its membership reflects the diversity of the larger society, the
more limited and noncontroversial will tend to be the set of goals,
however important they may be, that it can effectively pursue....
[A] bar association that is broadly representative of the major elements within the profession is less and less likely to be able to satisfy all of its constituencies. There are too many groups within the
profession that have too many conflicts with too many other
groups-conflicts that are deep-seated and not subject to compromise. Any action of the association that would be likely to be regarded as "decisive" or "progressive"
is also likely to offend one or
44
more of these major factions.
The tension between diversity and efficacy tends to be greatest in
the most inclusive-that is, comprehensive and unified-bar associations;45 however, observers report the same tension in many specialty
bars. For instance, the National Lawyers' Guild was formed to challenge the perceived conservatism of the ABA, but was immediately
"[h]amstrung by ...internecine squabbling between the radicals and
42. See generally M.

LOUISE RUTHERFORD, THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocI-

ATION ON PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION

(1937);

EDSON

R. SUNDERLAND,

HISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK (1953); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar

Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 677
(1989); Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politicsand Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM.& MARY L. REV. 2001 (2005).
43. On the Chicago Bar Association, see generally HALLIDAY, supra note 17; Terence C. Halliday & Charles L. Cappell, Indicatorsof Democracy in ProfessionalAssociations: Elite Recruitment, Turnover, and Decision Making in a Metropolitan Bar Association, 1979 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 697; and Heinz et al., supra note 17. On the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, see generally GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970 (1970); and POWELL,
supra note 18.

44. Heinz et al., supra note 17, at 771-72.
45. See Johnstone, supranote 7, at 232 (stating that "what follows almost invariably from large
memberships in comprehensive bar associations is stultified programmatic action").
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the liberals. '46 The American College of Real Estate Lawyers (ACREL), whose members represent many types of clients, limits its in47
volvement in policy issues to avoid taking sides among members.
Thus, diverse representation may lead to "stultified programmatic action, ' 48 even in bar associations that are organized around lawyers'
49
specialized interests.
The empirical literature suggests that the recipe for effective political action is not viewpoint diversity but rather status and insulation
from competing views. Most examples of successful law reform-defined by whether the bar's proposed changes were effected-have
been achieved by small groups of professionally and politically prominent lawyers, who began the process with a strong value consensus.
Value consensus appears to be especially important for effective political action outside the boundaries of lawyers' core areas of expertise.
In his study of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(ABCNY), for example, Michael J. Powell identified four resources
that are necessary for the successful exercise of professional influence
over policy issues. 50 The first is technical expertise. As Powell noted,
it is technical expertise that justifies the profession's entry into policy
debates in the first place, and, historically, the profession's influence
has been strongest on matters with a significant technical component.
For instance, lawyers tend to be influential in the process of drafting
legal and administrative rules. 51 Technical expertise also provides a
cover for lawyers with a substantive agenda, because "frequently,
what appear to be technical concerns have important substantive
52
implications.
Technical expertise is not sufficient to guarantee political effectiveness, however. Other necessary resources include money, prestige,
46. Michael Powell. Anatomy of a Counter-BarAssociation: The Chicago Council of Lawyers,
1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501, 502-03.

47. See Judith Kilpatrick. Specialty Lawyer Associations: Their Role in the Socialization Process. 33 GONz. L. REv. 501, 536 (1997).

48. Johnstone. supra note 7, at 232.
49. See Michael John Balaoing, The Challenge of Asian Pacific American Diversity and Unity:
A Study of Individual Ethnic Bar Associations Within the Asian Pacific American Community of

Los Angeles. 2 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1994) (reporting significant tensions in the effort to
merge four separate Asian Pacific American bar associations in Los Angeles): Kilpatrick, supra
note 47. at 535-36 (discussing the limited scope of ACREL's law reform efforts and reporting
-some frustration" with its approach).
50. POWELL, supra note 18, at 179-93.

51. Id. at 181 (discussing the role of Illinois bar associations in drafting the Illinois Criminal
Code and noting that "[tlhe product of the bar associations was adopted almost in its entirety").
52. Id. ("Recognizing that their technical expertise provides an avenue for legitimate entry
into the policy-making process, lawyers may ... emphasize their technical contributions when in
fact they are also interested in the substance of the issues involved.")
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and social connections, such as those stemming from law school ties
and lawyers' interorganizational mobility. 53 For instance, Powell attributed much of the ABCNY's success in achieving its law reform
goals 54 to the revenues it was able to generate from its relatively high
dues and additional, voluntary contributions from Wall Street law
firms.55 The social connections of bar leaders, many of whom served
on foundation boards, also allowed the ABCNY to secure grants from
private foundations headquartered in New York City. These grants, in
turn, enabled the ABCNY to create special committees with paid professional staffs to research and write high-quality reports on the policy
issues of the day. Several of the ABCNY's law reform efforts "utilized the highly professional work of such special committees funded
'56
by foundation[ ] grants.
Powell's emphasis on the importance of reformers' social and professional statuses is echoed in numerous other accounts of successful
law reform efforts. Most successful groups have been highly selective
and exclusive in their membership. For instance, the ALI has been
described as an elitist organization, 57 and certainly its membership
policies are exclusive. With the exception of ex officio members designated by the bylaws, ALI membership requires two sponsors, recommendation by the membership committee, and election by the
council. 5 8 Yet, notwithstanding criticism of some of its output 59 and
60
complaints about a lack of viewpoint diversity among its members,

53. Id. at 182-84 (discussing the movement of ABCNY leaders in and out of New York law
firms, state government, and federal regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
54. See id. at 184-88 (discussing the ABCNY's opposition to the Bricker Amendment, which
would have restricted the treaty-making authority of the executive branch); id. at 217-19 (discussing the ABCNY's efforts to liberalize the grounds for divorce in New York).
55. Id. at 182.
56. POWELL, supra note 18, at 182.
57. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 35 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Remarks. 67 A.L.I.
PROC. 131, 133 (1990)).
58. See Elson, supra note 30, at 631 (discussing the relationship between exclusive selection
procedures and member independence from special interests): N.E.H. Hull. Restatement and
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV.
55, 85-86 (1990) (describing the credentials of the founding members).
59. See Abrahamson, supra note 57, at 34 (reviewing the critical literature); Elson. supra note

30, at 626 (reviewing the same).
60. See Richard A. Posner, Remarks Preparedfor Delivery at the Annual Dinner of the American Law Institute, May 18, 1995, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REMARKS ANI) ADDRESSES AT
THE 72ND ANNUAL MEETING, May 18, 1995, at 4-47 (arguing that the ALl lacks intellectual and

generational diversity).
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the ALl has been effective in influencing public policy outcomes. 6'
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., former director of the ALl, described its elitism as a strength, stating that "[t]hose who have the ability, opportunity, the capacity for responsibility, and equally, as I have said, luck,
should accept the responsibility to look at the society from the larger
'' 62
public-interest perspective.
Another consistent finding that emerges from the empirical literature is the importance of value consensus and insulation from competing views. As Powell noted, the ABCNY was a relatively homogenous
organization throughout the 1950s and 1960s 6 3 and "enjoyed a high
degree of value consensus. ' 64 As a result, "the ABCNY was able to
adopt strong, uncompromising policy positions . . . [ijn contrast [to]
'65
more heterogenous and inclusive organizations such as the CBA."
Susan D. Carle's account of the early history of the legal committee
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) likewise highlights the importance of having a shared, perhaps even dogmatic, worldview. 66 Carle focused on the relationship
between the members of the NAACP's first national legal committee
and the legal ethics establishment in New York City. Her central
question was how NAACP legal committee members were able to reconcile their own use of nontraditional litigation techniques, such as
the solicitation of strangers as clients, "while sitting on bar committees
''67
that penalized other practitioners for similar conduct.
Her answer was that committee members "drew a distinction between their motives, which they knew to be ethically pure, involving
pro bono work for others, and the motives of those from a lower
strata of the bar, who were engaging in comparable activities with pecuniary, self-interested intent. '6 8 According to Carle, this "world
view was based on a universalist understanding of the public good,
very different from contemporary understandings of pluralist politics." ' 69 Carle elaborated on this worldview as follows:
61. See Abrahamson, supra note 57, at 3-4 (discussing the influence of the restatements):
Charles W. Wolfram, Bismark's Sausages and the ALI's Restatements, 26 HOFSrRA L. REV. 817,
834 (1998) (concluding that the ALl "seems to work well in spite of itself").
62. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Remarks, 67 A.L.I. PROC. 131, 133 (1990).
63. POWELL, supra note 18, at 180.

64. Id. at 220.
65. Id. (discussing the ABCNY's adoption of a "'pure'
proposal").
66. See Carle, supra note 18, at 97.
67. Id. at 100.
68. Id.
69. Id.

no-fault accident-compensation
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To the optimistic early twentieth-century mindset of the lawyers on
the legal committee, legal solutions to social injustice were ascertainable through study and analysis-one's perspective did not vary
depending on one's position in society. This universalist understanding of social justice translated into a sense of confidence about
the reach of legal ethics rules. The purpose of these rules was to
prohibit "bad" conduct but not to interfere with "good," altruistically motivated endeavors. That there could be anything suspect
about the legal committee members judging these questions when
their own conduct was at issue simply would not have occurred to
them. 70
The importance of value consensus for the success of bar law reform
efforts is consistent with experimental research on the dynamics of
group deliberation. Such research finds that group deliberation is of
limited value in bridging political divides, especially where individuals'
initial views and values are strongly held. 7 1 Instead, group deliberation tends to amplify individuals' preexisting views and shift the group
as a whole toward a more extreme position. 72
This tendency toward "ideological amplification '73 is perhaps unsurprising in likeminded groups. For instance, one recent study divided participants into groups of liberals and conservatives and asked
each group to deliberate for fifteen minutes about global warming,
affirmative action, and same-sex civil unions. 74 After deliberating, the
liberal groups became more liberal on all three issues, and the conservative groups became more conservative, as measured by the mean
75
view for each group.
Interestingly, however, a similar phenomenon called "group polarization" occurs in mixed groups. 7 6 The term "group polarization" is
somewhat misleading, in that it does not refer to the tendency of a
group to shift toward two poles. 77 Rather, it refers to the tendency of
deliberating groups to coalesce, not around the middle of the range of
members' views, but around a more extreme version of the majority
70.
71.
92-93
72.

Id. at 144.
See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 226 (2d ed. 1986); Sunstein, supra note 19, at
(reviewing experimental research).
See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 85-90.
73. See Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 917 (defining ideological amplification as "an amplification of preexisting ideological tendencies, in which group discussion leads to greater
extremism").
74. Id. at 920 (explaining the methodology of the study).
75. Id. at 917, 921 (summarizing the results of the study).
76. Id. at 927 (defining "ideological amplification" as "a special case of group polarization").
77. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 85.
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position. 78 Thus, on policy matters where mixed groups are asked to
reach a consensus, the best predictor of the decision's direction is the
median predeliberation view of group members. 79 In most contexts,
however, groups also move toward a more extreme version of the median predeliberation view.80 The fact that some group members op81
pose the view does not prevent a group shift from occurring.
For instance, a study of mock jury decisions about punishment and
punitive damages found that the direction of group decisions was
largely a function of members' predeliberation views, even when there
was considerable diversity in those views.8 2 Thus, group decisions
about whether to punish were unaffected by deliberation. When a
majority of jurors favored punishment, the jury would recommend
punishment, and when a majority favored none, the jury verdict was
"virtually certain" to be none. 83 In actual juries that do not hang, the
median predeliberation verdict predicts the outcome 90% of the
84
time.
Deliberation did, however, produce a "severity shift" in group punishment ratings and dollar awards for punitive damages.8 5 Among
mock juries that awarded any punitive damages, "27% reached dollar
verdicts that were as high as or higher than the highest predeliberation
judgment of their individual members. ' 86 Moreover, the size of the
severity shift was unrelated to the level of predeliberation agreement
among jurors. Thus, sizeable shifts occurred even in groups whose
members were in substantial disagreement about whether or how
87
much to punish.
Researchers attribute the phenomenon of group polarization to a
variety of causes, some of which suggest design interventions for bar
78. Id.; see also Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 927 ("[G]roup polarization refers to the
tendency of deliberating groups to shift to a more extreme position in line with the pre-deliberation tendencies of their members.").
79. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 210-12; Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as
a Polarizerof Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1969): Schkade et al., supra

note 19, at 925-35 (reviewing the experimental literature).
80. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 85 (stating that '[g]roup polarization is among the most
robust patterns found in deliberating bodies"). See also Cass R. Sunstein. The Law of Group
Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002).

81.
82.
1139.
83.
effect
84.
85.
86.
87.

Sunstein, supra note 19, at 94.
David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift. 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1140-41 (2000) (summarizing the findings of the study).
Id. at 1153 (discussing the decision to punish and reporting "no evidence of any systematic
of deliberation on outcomes").
See BROWN. supra note 71. at 229: Sunstein, supra note 19, at 103.
See Schkade et al., supra note 82. at 1140 (reporting evidence of a severity shift).
Id.
Id. at 1156.
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committees, as discussed in Part IV.88 One cause is people's urge for
social conformity, which leads them to defer to the opinions of others
whether or not they actually agree. 89 In a classic experiment by Solomon E. Asch, for example, subjects in groups were asked to match a
line drawn on a card to one of identical length, selected from among
three choices. 90 After several rounds of matching in which all members of the group agreed, some members-Asch's confederateschose the wrong line in what was clearly an error.9 1 Nevertheless,
under pressure from the majority, minority subjects went along with
92
the error 36.8% of the time.
The urge for conformity does not explain the tendency of groups to
shift toward more extreme positions, however. That shift is better explained as the result of "social comparison" and the limited argument
pools that are present in many groups. 93 Social comparison refers to
people's desire to be perceived favorably by people with whom they
identify. 94 For instance, among groups of young men asked questions
about risk taking, individual men "may want to be perceived (and to
perceive themselves) as daring risk-takers. ' 95 Likewise, among
groups of liberals, individuals who view themselves as slightly left-ofcenter may shift their position to the left to maintain their accustomed
96
position relative to others in the group.
Limited argument pools are the result of unbalanced (or uninformed) groups, in which group members' predispositions affect the
range of arguments available. 97 For instance, in a group of seven with
two members in favor and five opposed, there are likely to be more
and better arguments available to the members opposed. 98 Where argument pools are limited, minority views tend to be suppressed or to

88. See infra notes 105-136 and accompanying text.
89. Schkade et al., supra note 19. at 925: Sunstein, supra note 19, at 77-81.
90. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL

ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 7th ed. 1995).
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. Id. at 16; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 79-80 (discussing Asch's experiment).
93. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 88-90 (reviewing theoretical explanations for group
polarization).
94. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 210-29 (reviewing the literature on social comparison): Sunstein, supra note 19, at 88-89 (providing an overview of social comparison research).
95. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 88.
96. See Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 932.
97. See Sunstein. supra note 19, at 75-76 (discussing the dangers of "enclave deliberation").
98. Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 930-31; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 89 (discussing informational influences on group polarization).
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give way to "cascade" effects. 99 Cass R. Sunstein has explained these
effects:
People typically have different thresholds for choosing to believe or
do something new or different. As those with low thresholds come
to a certain belief or action, people with somewhat higher thresholds join them, possibly to a point where a critical mass is reached,
making groups... "tip." The result of this process can be to produce snowball or cascade effects ....Consider, for example, smoking, participating in protests, striking, buying stocks ... even leaving

bad dinner parties. 1°°
As a result of social comparison and social cascades, groups that start
out slightly unbalanced tend to become more unbalanced as the result
of group deliberation.
The experimental literature suggests limited conditions for productive deliberation in mixed political groups. To the extent that group
members are not entrenched in their views and do not have reasons to
identify with or against other members of the group, well-balanced
groups may be capable of productive deliberation, in which social
pressures take a backseat to informational influences, such as exposure to new facts and arguments. In James S. Fishkin's experiments
on deliberative polling, for instance, in which mixed groups have access to balanced briefing materials and a neutral facilitator and are not
asked to reach a decision, many members report changes in their
views as the result of deliberation.10o
On the other hand, where people are entrenched in their views, as is
often the case in public policy debates, deliberation tends to be unproductive-much as the bar literature would suggest. 0 2 For instance,
group deliberation tends to have little influence on people's views
about abortion and capital punishment. 10 3 The experimental literature suggests the same would hold true for any divisive issue about
which group members have devoted significant thought. Research
shows that, "when people have a fixed view of some highly salient
99. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 81-84 (discussing "informational" and "reputational"
cascades).
100. Id. at 82.
101. See FISHKIN, supra note 29.
102. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 226 (stating that "familiar and long-debated issues do not
depolarize easily").
103. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 22-24, 54-56 (2006) (finding that ideological amplification generally occurs
in the federal judiciary, except in cases involving abortion and capital punishment, where judicial
judgments are firmly held); Eugene Burnstein, Persuasion as Argument Processing, in GROUP
DECISION MAKING 103, 111-12 (Hermann Brandstatter et al. eds., 1982) (finding the least depolarization with highly visible public policy questions, such as whether capital punishment is
justified).
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public issue, they are likely to have heard a wide range of arguments
in various directions, producing a full argument pool, and additional
10 4
discussion is not likely to produce movement.'
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Based on the bar association and group deliberation research, one
might argue that the ABA and other comprehensive bar associations
should avoid controversial political issues altogether and limit their
law reform activities to technical issues, such as drafting and statutory
interpretation. For instance, Johnstone takes this position in his review of bar law reform efforts, specifically mentioning abortion as an
example of an issue that should be avoided:
An association should limit or avoid involvement with an issue if
that involvement threatens to cause a substantial number of its
members to resign or become inactive, or if that involvement threatens the association's general effectiveness. Caution is especially advisable on contentious social issues that have little direct bearing on
the legal profession and the usual work of lawyers. It seems particularly foolish for a bar association to risk its viability over issues regarding which it cannot realistically expect to exert much influence.
for the
For example, there have been very disruptive consequences
10 5
ABA when it has taken up the issue of abortion.
Some bar associations also take this position and have adopted selfimposed limits on political involvement. For instance, ACREL limits
its official involvement to the clarification of statutory or regulatory
language and the identification of "mechanical" problems with proposed laws or regulations.' 0 6 The Bar Association of Metropolitan St.
Louis has adopted guidelines for political involvement that, among
other things, require that the issue "is not clearly inappropriate" and
"that the position to be taken would be supported by an informed
membership.' 0 7 According to the ABA's 2005 Bar Activities Inventory, 45% of unified state bars and 25% of voluntary state bars do not
take positions on federal legislation, and 17% of unified state bars do
10 8
not take positions on state legislation.
104. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 93 (discussing "depolarization").
105. Johnstone, supra note 7, at 240. More than 1,500 lawyers resigned from the ABA after
the House of Delegates endorsed pro-choice legislation in 1990. James Podgers, Which Way
ABA?:

Pondering New Policy Directions, 78 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 61.

106. Kilpatrick, supra note 47, at 536 (quoting Telephone Interview with Roger Schwenke,
ACREL member (Mar. 11, 1997)).
107. Johnstone, supra note 7, at 229 n.201 (citing Deirdre 0. Smith, President's Report, Where
We Stand, ST. Louis B.J., Winter 1995, at 3).
108. 2005 BAR AcTIvITIES INVENTORY, supra note 7, at VIII (Governmental Relations).
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Such limits do not prevent individual lawyers from attempting to
improve law and policy through other means, including membership
in other types of legal and political organizations. Nor do they prevent the organized bar from serving the public interest in specialized
and technical areas of law. Indeed, one might argue that the public
role of the profession has not diminished, but merely shifted to more
specialized areas of practice. 10 9 As Gordon has observed, the lawyerstatesman ideal originated when the United States was an immature
state without the public bureaucracies, academic institutions, or advocacy organizations that now do much of the work originally done by
the private bar. 110 Now "the age of the gentleman-amateur" statesman has passed, and politics have become more democratized.I' Perhaps the story is one of decentralization and increasing specialization,
rather than professional or moral decline.
For instance, bar association committees have been active and
seemingly independent of client interests in the regulation of thirdparty closing opinions. 112 According to a recent study by Jonathan C.
Lipson, many aspects of closing opinion practice are shaped by "noneconomic social forces," including lawyers' professional pride. 1 3 Lipson noted especially the active role of bar association committees:
A comparatively small coterie of opinion "gurus" sits on these committees, both at the state and national level. They apparently know
one another, either personally or by reputation, and often collaborate on opinion-related bar association projects. These gurus are
not remunerated in any direct or significant way for the service they
provide. While there are undoubtedly many reasons for volunteering in this way, one reason is .
14

.

. a kind of pride, both civic and

personal.1
Likewise, Tanina Rostain has challenged the importance of client interests in explaining the role of the tax bar in curbing abusive corporate tax shelters. 1 5 Based on a detailed review of the bar's various
reform initiatives, Rostain concluded that "it is implausible to explain
the organized tax bar's support of reform in terms of its members' or
its clients' financial interests."' 1 6 Instead, she argued, "the bar [was]
109. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 66 (referring to this as the "relocation" thesis).

110. Id. at 65.
111. Id.
112. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice

Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 59, 115-22 (2005).
113. Id. at 62-65.
114. Id. at 122.
115. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry,
23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 113 (2006).

116. Id.
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seeking to restore the importance of tax expertise based in judicial
doctrines" and "affirm the status of tax lawyers as guardians of the tax

system."'

17

While these examples highlight the potential for professional independence on the part of highly specialized groups, such efforts are no
substitute for visible, sustained public policy involvement by the comprehensive bar. This Part argues that comprehensive bar associations
have something special to offer in divisive policy debates. This does
not mean that bar associations should jump in on all issues or that
some issues are not best left to other forums. But the bar should reject the conflict avoidance strategy suggested by Johnstone and others.
To begin with, this strategy relies on the slippery distinction between "legal" and "political" issues. However clear this distinction
may be at the margins, many important public policy debates, such as
those about privilege and torture, involve both. By avoiding controversial political issues, bar associations are likely to remove themselves from the most pressing legal issues of the day.
Moveover, lawyers have special training in civic and political debate. This is not to say that lawyers are "uniquely endowed with political wisdom and insight into everybody's long-term best interests."' 1 8
As Gordon has noted, this pompous version of the lawyer-statesman
ideal "was always ridiculous. '" 9 But lawyers have special training in
the art of detachment 120 and special exposure to the argument pool
about the distinction between law and politics. Lawyers are also
uniquely motivated to invest in civic debate. How many mentors have
told their prot6g6s to develop their professional networks by participating in bar activities? Thus, from a societal perspective, bar associations are an important deliberative enclave where like-minded
citizens-by virtue of shared professional training-can develop 12and
1
amplify arguments that might be "squelched in general debate.
Finally, the bar has a unique opportunity to improve the quality of
deliberative institutions. Bar associations represent a massive institutional apparatus and a valuable set of sites for democratic experimentation. In addition to the ABA and 53 state bar associations, there are
117. Id. at 113-14.
118. Gordon, supra note 13, at 74 (discussing critiques of the lawyer-statesman ideal based on
competence).
119. Id.
120. Id. (noting that lawyers "are professionally capable of detachment, able to see different
sides of a problem").
121. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 111 (discussing the advantages of "enclave deliberation" and
noting that "many social movements have been made possible through this route"). The rights
of criminal defendants come to mind.
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111 local bar associations with an average membership of more than
3,000 lawyers. 122 The combined expenditures of local bar associations
alone is over $100 million per year. 123 Even if only a small fraction of
bar activities were devoted to law reform, the aggregate effort and
investment represents a huge resource.
Bar associations should be more explicit and purposeful in tapping
this resource. This means, first, acknowledging the limits of what bar
committees can accomplish in divisive policy debates. As Part III explained, representative bar groups are unlikely to reach consensus on
divisive issues through group deliberation. 24 Thus, proposing specific
policy outcomes may be unrealistic. Moreover, the experimental literature suggests that directing deliberative groups to focus on outcomes
may increase group polarization. 2 5 There are, however, other valuable contributions that bar committees can make.
For example, bar committees can deliberate without attempting to
propose an outcome but rather as a means of developing briefing
materials for other groups. Many bar committees already engage in
extensive research and fact finding and produce detailed substantive
126
reports and minority reports for lawyers, legislatures, and others.
Much of the value of such reports is not in the specific policy outcomes that they propose, but rather in their contribution to the argument pool. 127 Most bar associations also produce materials for
continuing legal education.1 2 8 Representative committees may be especially useful in producing balanced materials and identifying where
irresolvable political divisions exist.
Bar committees can also deliberate as a means of self-consciously
testing the benefits of different structural designs. 129 The deliberation
research suggests that even relatively modest design innovations may
122. 2005 BAR ACTIVITIES INVENTORY. supra note 7 (Section 1).

123. Id.
124. See supra notes 42-104 and accompanying text.
125. See Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 939 (distinguishing between "deliberating groups
that attempt to reach a shared conclusion (as in our study) and deliberating groups that simply
talk (as in Fishkin's studies)") Sunstein, supra note 19, at 117.
126. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n. Substantive Reports, http://www.nysba.org/ (select "Publications"; then follow "Substantive Reports" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) (listing reports
by various committees of the NYSBA).
127. See, e.g., ELIZABETH COOPER, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMIrrEE TO STUDY ISSUES AFFECTING SAME-SEX COUPLES (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Oct. 2004)

(explaining the legal implications of civil unions versus same-sex marriages).
128. 2005 BAR ACTIVITIES INVENTORY, supra note 7, at III (Continuing Legal Education).

Eighty-two percent of state bar associations and ninety-five percent of local bar associations
conduct CLE programming. Id.
129. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 352 (arguing that "lawyers have a great role to
play in the practice of democracy as . . . 'process architects'").
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improve deliberation and reduce the usual tendency toward group polarization. 130 For instance, Fishkin's experiments with deliberative
polling suggest that the use of a facilitator may help to expand the
argument pool and limit cascade effects.' 3 1 Research on mediation
and other forms of dispute resolution also suggests that "expert
facilitators can minimize strategic gaming and bargaining" and help to
build group consensus. 32 Indeed, simply making participants aware
of the effects of limited argument pools and the nature of social influence within groups may help "inoculat[e]" participants against inadequate arguments. 133 As a result of their specialized training in
advocacy and structured argument, lawyers may be especially receptive to such interventions.
Bar associations should strive to contribute to ongoing research
about the potential benefits of different institutional designs. In addition to opening up a whole new angle for jokes about lawyers and lab
rats, 134 such experimentation would be of immense academic-and
perhaps operational-value. Although most arguments about the
lawyer-statesman focus on public policy outcomes, particularly the
need to exert control over corporate America, 3 5 much democratic
theory focuses on the value of democratic discourse, both for the legitimacy of policy outcomes and for its independent associational and
expressive value. 136 Democratic theory thus invites the profession to
refocus its attention on the constitutive value of thoughtful civic debate. Bar associations are uniquely positioned to play this role.
130. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 108 ("The simplest lesson here involves individual susceptibility and [the importance of] institutional design."); Schkade et al., supra note 19, at 918
("[Ojur findings ... provide strong support for [deliberative] safeguards.").
131. See FISHKIN. supra note 29; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 117 (discussing Fishkin's
research).
132. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 362.
133. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 108-09.

134. See MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE
(2005) (providing an analysis of historic and contemporary trends in lawyer jokes). In 2002,
Galanter identified the following joke as "the single most prevalent of all current lawyer jokes":
"Why have research laboratories started using lawyers instead of rats in their experiments?
There are three reasons: first, there are more of them; second, the lab assistants don't get attached to them; and third, there are some things a rat just won't do." Marc Galanter, Changing
Legal Consciousness in America: The View From the Joke Corpus, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223,
2234 (2002) (emphasis in original).
135. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 2-3, 15 (tracing the evolution of the lawyer-statesman ideal
and noting proponents' particular emphasis on ind ependence from corporate clients).
136. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 347-59 (reviewing discourse theory); James A.
Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63
TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996) (criticizing discourse theory).
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CONCLUSION

ABA leaders have recently called for a "Renaissance of Idealism"
in the legal profession-a recommitment by lawyers to engage in pro
bono and public service. 137 In its final report, the ABA Commission
on the Renaissance of Idealism in the Legal Profession identified time
constraints as the main obstacle to lawyers' public service and urged
"decision makers in America's law offices to free up time for lawyers
13 8
to volunteer."'
This Article has focused on what happens when those busy idealists
serve on bar law reform committees. How can lawyers make the best
use of the time they devote to bar-sponsored public service? How
should bar associations channel the idealistic-and commercial-impulses of their members? To answer those questions, this Article has
argued, a dose of realism is in order.
Bar committees should be realistic about the kinds of contributions
they can make and their expectations for individual members. This
does not mean shying away from high-profile political debates; on the
contrary, bar committees may be uniquely valuable in such debates. It
does, however, mean being informed about the consequences of viewpoint diversity and the dynamics of group deliberation. It means placing more emphasis on research, fact finding, and the clear articulation
of issues, rather than focusing only or primarily on outcomes where
political differences are entrenched. Finally, it means exploiting the
strengths of bar associations as institutions and sites for democratic
experimentation.
Bar associations embody many of the tensions in modern democracy, including the fundamental tension between viewpoint diversity
and political efficacy. Identifying constructive responses to this tension, and models for public service in the face of it, is a realistic ideal.

137. ABA
138. Id.

RENAISSANCE REPORT,

supra note 3, at 2.

